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DANISH MORTGAGE REGULATIONS—
STRUCTURE, EVOLUTION, AND CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Danish mortgage system was hailed by the International Monetary 
Fund in late 2006 as ―highly rated‖ and one of the ―most sophisticated‖ 
mortgage systems in the world.
1
 All mortgages granted by credit 
institutions to property purchasers (―Homebuyers‖) in Denmark must be 
supported by an ―equivalent bond with a maturity and cashflow that 
matches those of the underlying loan almost perfectly.‖2 This foundational 
principle, known as the ―balance principle,‖ balanceprincippet, is codified 
in Danish law
3
 and has been the basis and hallmark of Denmark‘s 
mortgage market model since the market‘s inception in 1797.4  
 
 
 1. INT‘L MONETARY FUND, THE DANISH MORTGAGE MARKET—A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 3 
(2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07123.pdf [hereinafter THE 
DANISH MORTGAGE MARKET—A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS]. 
 2. A Slice of Danish, ECONOMIST, Jan. 3, 2009, at 55. When a mortgage bond matches the 
maturity and cashflow of an underlying mortgage, the ―income‖ earned by the credit institution from 
the interest payments on the loan by the homeowner ―covers‖ the credit institution‘s payments to a 
bond holder.  
 3. LOV. Nr. 454, om realkreditlån og realkreditobligationer m.v., af. 10/06/2003, §§ 19–21, 
available at https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=26295:  
Obligationsudstedelse og balanceprincip  
§ 19. Realkreditobligationer skal være omsættelige massegældsbreve eller fondsaktiver og 
optaget til offentlig notering på en fondsbørs.  
§ 20. Midler fremkommet ved udstedelse af realkreditobligationer eller andre værdipapirer 
kan alene anvendes til udlån mod pant i fast ejendom, jf. dog stk. 2 og 3.  
Stk. 2. Finanstilsynet kan fastsætte regler om, at midler i begrænset omfang kan anvendes til 
andet end udlån mod pant i fast ejendom.  
Stk. 3. Finanstilsynet kan tillade, at der i koncernforhold kan udstedes realkreditobligationer 
og andre værdipapirer i et realkreditinstitut til finansiering af realkreditlån i et andet 
realkreditinstitut.  
§ 21. Finanstilsynet fastsætter regler om opgørelse af og grænser for:  
(1) Forskellen mellem de fremtidige betalinger på udstedte realkreditobligationer og andre 
værdipapirer på den ene side og de fremtidige betalinger på pantebreve og finansielle 
instrumenter på den anden side,  
(2) den renterisiko, der følger af den i nr. 1 nævnte forskel, og  
(3) forskellen mellem indfrielsesvilkårene for udstedte realkreditobligationer og andre 
værdipapirer på den ene side og pantebreve og finansielle instrumenter på den anden side.  
See also the unofficial English translation of Act. No. 454 at http://195.184.36.35/Lov.aspx?ItemID= 
1a979082-76fa-4904-8d1d-b8536d86ea62 (last visited Jan. 14, 2009): 
Issue of bonds and the balance principle 
19. Mortgage-credit bonds shall be convertible mass debt instruments or securities and shall 
be admitted for public quotation on a stock exchange.  
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At first glance, the mortgage market system of a small Scandinavian 
country with a population of approximately 5.5 million and a land area of 
slightly under 43,000 square kilometers (slightly less than twice the size of 
Massachusetts),
5
 may seem insignificant. However, in contrast to the 
country‘s land size and population, the Danish mortgage market, relative 
to its gross domestic product (―GDP‖), is the largest in the world.6 Further, 
in terms of sheer monetary value, it is the second-largest mortgage market 
in Europe.
7
 This ―tiny‖ country has an immense value in its real estate. 
Mortgage bonds comprise just over seventy percent of the Danish bond 
market.
8
 Financial organizations call Danish mortgage bonds ―very strong 
 
 
20. (1) Funds raised by the issue of mortgage-credit bonds or other securities may solely be 
used for lending against mortgages on real property, see however subsections (2) and (3) 
hereof.  
(2) The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority may lay down rules that funds may, to a 
limited extent, be used for purposes other than lending against mortgages on real property.  
(3) The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority may in group circumstances permit the issue 
of mortgage-credit bonds and other securities in a mortgage-credit institution for the purpose 
of financing mortgage loans in another mortgage-credit institution.  
21. The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority may lay down rules on calculations of and 
limits for:  
(1) the difference between, on the one hand, future payments on mortgage-credit bonds and 
other securities issued, and on the other hand, future payments on mortgages and financial 
instruments,  
(2) interest-rate risk caused by the difference mentioned in no. 1 hereof, and  
(3) the difference between, on the one hand, the redemption terms of mortgage-credit bonds 
and other securities issued and, on the other hand, mortgages and financial instruments.  
 4. KNUD WESTLUND, REALKREDIT: HISTORISK, ØKONOMISK OG FORVALTNINGSMÆSSIG 
UDVIKLING AF ORGANISERET REALKREDIT I DEN VESTLIGE VERDEN GENNEM 200 ÅR 42 (1967) (The 
Creditor Association for Copenhagen Homeowners, Kreditkassen for Husejere i København, was 
created in 1797 with the purpose of granting mortgages to the homeowner-victims of the 1795 
Copenhagen fire.).  
 5. Estimates are current as of July 2008. Central Intelligence Agency, Denmark, WORLD 
FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/da.html (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2010). 
 6. ―[The Danish mortgage] market is far bigger than Germany‘s or America‘s.‖ A Danish 
Model in Aztec Dress; Mortgages, ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 2007, at 62 [hereinafter Aztec Dress]. ―The 
total volume of outstanding mortgage debt [in Denmark] totaled 101% of GDP in 2003, compared to 
81% in the U.S.‖ Mikkel Svenstrup & Søren Willemann, Reforming Housing Finance: Perspectives 
from Denmark, J. REAL EST. RES. 105, 105–06 (2006). See also Janne Thomsen & Arjan Verbeek, 
Danish Mortgage Bonds (Realkreditobligationer): Highly Secure Financial Instruments—Special 
Comment, in MOODY‘S INVESTOR SERVICE—GLOBAL CREDIT RESEARCH 3 (Maya Penrose ed., 2002), 
available at http://www.realkreditraadet.dk/Admin/Public/DWSDownload.aspx?File=%2FFiles%2F 
Filer%2Fpdf%2Fanalyser%2FMoodys_2002_RKR.pdf (Danish mortgage market is the largest in the 
world in per capita terms). 
 7. REALKREDIT DANMARK, DANISH MORTGAGE BONDS 9 (2007), available at http://www. 
danskebank.com/da-dk/ir/Documents/Other/DanishMortgageBondMarket2007.pdf (The Danish 
mortgage market is second in Europe to Germany‘s Pfandbrief mortgage market.). 
 8. DANMARKS NATIONALBANK, FINANCIAL STABILITY 2005, at 31 (2005), available at http:// 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss2/7
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and very low-risk financial instruments.‖9 In the over two hundred years 
since the inception of the mortgage bond market, ―there has never been an 
incidence of default on a Danish mortgage bond.‖10 Largely due to this 
stable regime, emerging mortgage markets, such as Mexico‘s, are now 
attempting to emulate the Danish system.
11
 Billionaire financier George 
Soros has also called for an adoption of the Danish system in the United 
States as well as in other countries.
12
  
Given this global high esteem and regard, the Danish system appears to 
be the ―best possible‖13 mortgage system yet to be conceived. As such, 
given the current unstable global financial climate, if any housing finance 
system were to retain integrity through these tough times, it ought to be 
the Danish version. This Note traces the history, development, and recent 
crises of the Danish mortgage system. It also examines how the amount of 
insularity the system has protects it from the global market while 
continuing to court global investors to its product.  
The strength of the Danish mortgage system was recently called into 
question when Denmark‘s eighth-largest bank went bankrupt in July 
2008.
14
 At that time, Roskilde Bank no longer met solvency requirements 
 
 
www.nationalbanken.dk/C1256BE9004F6416/side/Financial_Stability_2005_uk/$file/finstab05_uk_w
eb.pdf. 
 9. Thomsen & Verbeek, supra note 6, at 1.  
 10. Jens Thomsen, Governor, Danmarks Nationalbanken, Speech given on the seminar ―The 
Danish Mortgage Credit System‖ at the Royal Danish Embassy in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 20, 2006), 
(transcript available in DANMARKS NATIONALBANKEN, BACKGROUND TO JENS THOMSEN SPEECH ON 
20/4 IN WASHINGTON: DENMARK'S MORTGAGE CREDIT SYSTEM AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY 3 
(2006), http://www.nationalbanken.dk/C1256BE900406EF3/sysOakFil/JT_tale_Washington_april  
2006_ENG/$File/JT_Realkredit_tale_Wash_april06.pdf) [hereinafter Governor Jens Thomsen‘s 2006 
Speech]. 
 11. See Aztec Dress, supra note 6, at 62. 
 12. Billionaire George Soros Commends Danish Mortgage Credit System, MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK, EMBASSY OF DENMARK, WASHINGTON, D.C., Aug. 18, 2008, 
http://www.eksporttilusa.um.dk/da/servicemenu/NYheder/BillionaireGeorgeSorosCommendsDanishM
ortgageCreditSystem.htm. In fact, the Soros Foundation was instrumental in implementing the Danish-
styled mortgage system in Mexico in September 2005, which rolled out the first mortgages in 2006. Id. 
See also Mexico Chooses Danish Mortgage Credit System, INVEST IN DENMARK—MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK, Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.investindk.com/visNyhed.asp?artikelID= 
13669; VP Securities Services to Set Up Mortgage Credit System in Mexico, VP SECURITIES A/S, Sept. 
6, 2005, http://www.uk.vp.dk/C1256CF300390A8E/0/75FAEF723F8917C6C1257075002A6A03. 
 13. The term ―best possible‖ is borrowed from the ratings given to Danish mortgage bonds by 
Moody‘s and Standard and Poor‘s. In 2002, Danish mortgage bonds received next to ―best possible‖ 
ratings, receiving from Moody‘s a ―level Aaa-Aa2, where Aaa is the best possible rating. Standard & 
Poor‘s has given the Danish mortgage bonds ratings on the level AAA-AA, where AAA is the highest 
possible rating.‖ REALKREDITRÅDET [ASSOC. OF DANISH MORTGAGE BANKS], ASSOCIATION OF 
DANISH MORTGAGE BANKS—IN BRUSSELS 6, http://www.realkreditraadet.dk/Files/Filer/Engelsk/ 
Association_of_Danish_Mortgage_Bank_-_in_Brussels.pdf [hereinafter BANKS IN BRUSSELS].  
 14. See Press Release, Marc Dalgas, Head of Capital Markets, Roskilde Bank, Roskilde Bank 
A/S Mandates for Tender Offer and Consent Solicitation Process (Sept. 12, 2008), available at https:// 
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in the face of increasing ―write downs‖15 of real estate loans.16 Most of 
these real estate loans do not equate with mortgages regulated under the 
mortgage system, but are instead related to ―property development 
projects.‖17 Thus, Roskilde‘s demise was premised not on mortgage 
defaults or other problems with the mortgage bond system, but rather with 
Roskilde‘s other loans which failed due to the bank‘s ―‗slipshod‘ credit 
policy and a collapse in the local property market.‖18  
However, much of Roskilde‘s holdings were also nested in the 
mortgage credit market:
19
 
In common with most regional and local Danish banks, Roskilde 
Bank continues to finance its mortgage loans via mortgage 
providers Totalkredit/Nykredit and DLR Kredit. Since 2007, 
Roskilde Bank has not provided guarantees against losses in 
connection with the arrangement of mortgages to Totalkredit. 
Therefore, the guarantees against losses on mortgage loans will 
decrease. Going forward, losses on Totalkredit mortgages arranged 
 
 
www.roskildebank.dk/filarkiv/01_PressreleaseTenderOfferandConsentSolicitation.pdf  (discussing its 
July 14, 2008 announcement of its lack of liquidity and its plan to sell the bank).  
 15. The definition of ―write-offs‖ or ―write-downs‖ is: 
Write-down on loans: Under the new accounting rules, banking institutions‘ provisions are to 
be referred to as write-downs in future. For loans on which a loss is expected (i.e. there is an 
objective indication of a deterioration in value), the banking institutions must write down the 
loan to the present value of the expected future payments, including realisation of collateral.  
FINANCIAL STABILITY 2005, supra note 8, at 113. 
 16. See Kim McLaughlin & Rasmus Jorgensen, Denmark’s Roskilde: A Small Bank in Big 
Trouble, REUTERS, Aug. 25, 2008 [hereinafter Denmark’s Roskilde], http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
rbssBanks/idUSLP6004120080825. ―In [the second quarter] of 2008 Roskilde Bank significantly 
increased its writedowns which is estimated to result in a pretax loss of about DKK500 million . . . .‖ 
EEVA ANTILA, REYNOLD R. LEGERSTEE & KIMMO RAMA, MOODY‘S INVESTORS SERVICE, CREDIT 
OPINION: ROSKILDE BANK A/S, (2008) [hereinafter CREDIT OPINION: ROSKILDE BANK A/S], available 
at http://www.roskildebank.dk/filarkiv/ RoskildeCreditOpinion_060808.pdf. 
 17. CREDIT OPINION: ROSKILDE BANK A/S, supra note 16, at 3. In 2004, there was a rise of 
prioritetslån, a ―mortgage loan‖ or a ―home financing loan‖ directly issued by banks and not by 
mortgage credit institutions, which are structured by national mortgage regulations. See FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 2005, supra note 8, at 8, 19. Interest rates for prioritetslån are generally higher than those 
offered by the mortgage-credit institutions. Id. at 19. One type of such bank-initiated ―home financing 
loans‖ is the guaranteeing of the remaining 20% in a mortgage-credit loan that only provides a 80% 
loan to value ratio. Id. at 32 & n.1. Ironically, these loans were considered to ―entail a relatively low 
risk.‖ Id. at 8.  
 18. Denmark’s Roskilde, supra note 16. 
 19. ―The banking institutions‘ sales of mortgage-credit products are in some cases linked to a 
guarantee vis-à-vis the mortgage-credit institute . . . . In practice, under the guarantee system the 
intermediary banking institution assumes most of the credit risk associated with the mortgage-credit 
loan.‖ FINANCIAL STABILITY 2005, supra note 8, at 32. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss2/7
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by Roskilde Bank will be offset against the current commission to 
the bank for its current service to Totalkredit‘s borrowers.20  
 Thus, even though its liquidity woes were linked to bad real estate 
loans and not the mortgage bond market, Roskilde Bank‘s financial 
failures affected its guarantees against Homebuyers‘ default on mortgages 
arranged by the bank on behalf of the mortgage credit institutions. 
Later in July 2008, Roskilde Bank put itself up for sale.
21
 With no 
takers, it was bailed out by the Danish Central Bank, Nationalbanken, in 
August 2008.
22
 The bailout amounted to over 4.5 billion kroner, which 
was equivalent to approximately $897 million USD.
23
 Nationalbankens 
Governor Nils Bernstein expressed ―that other Danish banks‘ ability to 
access international capital could have been compromised if the central 
bank had not stepped in to guarantee Roskilde‘s debt.‖24 
Roskilde‘s demise brought to light a chink in the armor of the Danish 
mortgage system despite its reputation as a ―tightly regulated‖ market that 
traditionally ―shielded mortgage bonds from default risk.‖25 Since 2007, 
Roskilde Bank had not guaranteed any of its arranged mortgages with 
Totalkredit.
26
 Thus, while ―[m]ortgagors shall be liable for the loan 
[mortgage] personally and with the mortgaged property towards the series 
 
 
 20. CREDIT OPINION: ROSKILDE BANK A/S, supra note 16, at 4. There is a distinction between 
Danish mortgage banks (also known as mortgage credit institutions) and Danish commercial banks. 
Six Danish mortgage banks comprise the Association of Danish Mortgage Banks: BRFkredit, DLR 
Kredit, FIH Realkredit, LR Realkredit, Nykredit Realkredit, and Totalkredit. Realkreditraadet.dk, 
Medlemmer, Realkreditrådet [Members, Assoc. of Danish Mortgage Banks], http://www. 
realkreditraadet.dk/Om_os/Ledelse_-_organisation/Medlemmer.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). Other 
mortgage credit institutions include Nordea Credit and Realkredit Danmark. Finansraadet.dk, 
Realkreditinstitutter, [Mortgage Credit Institutes] http://www.finansraadet.dk/danish/menu/ 
publikationer/laantilerhvervslivet/realkredit/realkreditinstitutter (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). All 
mortgages (as opposed to any type of real estate loan, such as a prioritetslån) must have a source of 
issuance from a mortgage credit institute. See LOV Nr. 454, supra note 3, § 18 Stk. 1 
(―Realkreditinstitutter med tilladelse her i landet har eneret til at udstede realkreditobligationer her i 
landet.‖). See also the unofficial English translation of Act. No. 454, supra note 3 (―Mortgage-credit 
institutions authorised to conduct mortgage-credit business in Denmark shall hold exclusive rights to 
issue mortgage-credit bonds in Denmark.‖). Commercial banks such as Roskilde Bank, however, may 
arrange mortgages on behalf of mortgage credit institutions. Commercial banks gain commissions 
from mortgage credit institutions, such as Totalkredit and Nykredit, in exchange for their services to 
Homebuyers and their guarantees against Homebuyers‘ default. See CREDIT OPINION: ROSKILDE 
BANK A/S, supra note 16, at 4 (Danish regional and local banks can secure mortgage loan financing 
through mortgage credit institutes and receive fees for these loans).  
 21. Denmark’s Roskilde, supra note 16. 
 22. Kim McLaughlin & Peter Levring, Danish Central Bank Buys Out Ailing Roskilde Bank, 
REUTERS, Aug. 25, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/bankingFinancial/idUSLP56732520080825. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. (summarizing Bernstein‘s concern). 
 25. THE DANISH MORTGAGE MARKET—A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
 26. CREDIT OPINION: ROSKILDE BANK A/S, supra note 16, at 4.  
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or the mortgage-credit institution in general,‖27 in the event that 
Homebuyers default, mortgage credit institutions remain obliged to pay 
mortgage bond holders.
28
 If a commercial bank originally services the 
loan, it must also provide a guarantee to the mortgage credit institution 
should Homebuyers default; the ―link‖ between the lender and the risk-
holder in cases of default prevents irresponsible lending.
29
 Roskilde 
Bank‘s avoidance of guaranteeing mortgages to credit institutions 
shattered the payment-reinforcement mechanism that is central to 
Denmark‘s mortgage market system.  
How was it possible for a bank, within a tightly regulated, highly 
regarded mortgage system, to face liquidity problems and ultimately 
insolvency? If the Danish mortgage system is considered the best in the 
world, what are its weaknesses? Understanding the weaknesses of the 
―best‖ mortgage system could help identify similar, latent weaknesses in 
other nations‘ mortgage systems. Analyzing the Danish government‘s 
solutions to those weaknesses, and determining whether such actions 
translate to viable long-term solutions, will allow other systems to take 
more intelligent steps in safeguarding themselves from system failure.  
Answering these questions first requires an understanding of the 
history of the Danish mortgage system, including the evolution of its 
mortgage laws and regulations, and their operation on the mortgage 
system itself. The Danish mortgage system is largely financed by bonds, 
which are issued based on a ―balance principle‖—a 1:1 ratio of bonds to 
debt.
30
 This system has been adjusted over time to accommodate the 
various needs of investors and the health of the Danish economy in times 
of recession.  
Next, within this historical framework, this Note will analyze the 
current regulations. Further, this Note will discuss the significant areas of 
 
 
 27. Unofficial English translation of Act No. 454, supra note 3, § 23 Stk 1. See LOV Nr. 454, 
supra note 3, § 23 Stk 1 (―For lånet hæfter låntagerne både med det pantsatte og personligt over for 
serien henholdsvis realkreditinstituttet i øvrigt.‖).  
 28. See A Slice of Danish, supra note 2, at 55. ―[I]ssuers of mortgage bonds remain responsible 
for making payments on them.‖ Id. 
 29. ―[L]ax lending is encouraged when the link is broken between those who sell mortgages and 
those who bear the risk of default.‖ Id.  
 30. ―[T]he so-called ‗balance principle‘—which virtually eliminates the mortgage lender's 
funding risk—is the central pillar of the Danish system for mortgage finance.‖ Bob Pannell, Denmark: 
Probably the Best Housing Finance System in the World?, COUNCIL OF MORTGAGE LENDERS 
HOUSING FIN. (Council of Mortgage Lenders), Winter 2003, at 27, 29, available at http://www. 
cml.org.uk/cml/filegrab/pdf_pub_hf_603.pdf.pdf?ref=3367. ―In principle, the mortgage banks issue 
bonds with precisely the same nominal value and interest rate as the principal and the interest on the 
loans which the bonds finance.‖ REALKREDITRÅDET, DANISH MORTGAGE BONDS 8 (1998), http:// 
www.housingfinance.org/uploads/Publicationsmanager/Europe_danishmortgagebonds.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss2/7
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change and how these changes have affected the enviable stability of the 
Danish mortgage system relative to other investment options for global 
investors. Then, this Note will examine the burst of the Danish housing 
bubble through the lens of these new regulatory changes. 
II. HISTORY OF THE DANISH MORTGAGE SYSTEM 
The Danish mortgage system is traceable to 1795.
31
 That year, a large 
fire engulfed ―many . . . districts in the old town‖ of Copenhagen,32 the 
home of the Danish Parliament.
33
 The fire consumed over nine hundred 
properties,
34
 which was over one-fourth of the homes in Copenhagen.
35
 
The fire caused over 4.5 million rix-dollars
36
 in damage, only half of 
which was recoverable from Københavns Brandforsikring, the only fire 
insurance company in the city.
37
 The tremendous amount of destruction 
was partly due to the fact that streets in the older part of town were too 
narrow to allow adequate access to firefighters.
38
 
The vast destruction prompted a need for a massive increase in lending 
to fund new construction. Traditionally, lending had been given on an 
unsecured basis with interest capped at four percent.
39
 Both of these 
 
 
 31. WESTLUND, supra note 4, at 42. 
 32. J. K. Frederiksen et al., Engineering Geology of Copenhagen, 62 BULL. ENGINEERING 
GEOLOGY & ENV‘T 189, 200 (2003).  
 33. The Danish parliament, the Folketing or Folketinget, resides in the capital city of 
Copenhagen. Folketinget, http://www.ft.dk/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).   
 34. REALKREDITRÅDET [ASSOC. OF DANISH MORTGAGE BANKS], MORTGAGE FINANCING IN 
DENMARK 2, available at http://www.housingfinance.org/pdfstorage/Europe_mortgage%20finance% 
20in%20denmark.pdf [hereinafter REALKREDITRÅDET MORTGAGE FINANCING]. 
 35. BRFkredit.dk, Overblik Over det Danske Realkreditsystems Historie [Overview of the 
History of the Danish Mortgage Credit System], http://www.brf.dk/C1256F5C005ADF31/alldocs/ 
DOCJWIK-5KYKGT (last visited Jan. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Overblik] (―En voldsom brand hærgede i 
1795 København, og næsten en fjerdedel af byens huse brændte ned til grunden.‖), translation 
available at http://www.brf.dk/C1256A8000376E8E/alldocs/DOCJWIK-5KYKGT (―In 1795, a fire 
roared in Copenhagen and one fourth of the city was burned to the ground.‖). 
 36. REALKREDITRÅDET MORTGAGE FINANCING, supra note 34, at 2. A rix-dollar, or rigsdaler, 
references the currency used at the time. The currency was not changed to kroner until 1875. 
Danmarks Nationalbank, Fra Rigsdaler til Kroner, https://nationalbanken.dk/dndk/hist.nsf/side/Fra_ 
rigsdaler_til_kroner (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
 37. Id. 
 38.  
One of the consequences of these fires was the introduction of new fire regulations. The new 
regulations made it illegal to have streets as narrow as those that had been present in the old 
part of the town in order that, in the event of future fires, the fire brigade would be able to 
manoeuvre more easily.  
Frederiksen et al., supra note 32, at 200. 
 39. BRFkredit.dk, supra note 35 (―På det tidspunkt [før 1795] var renten ved lov begrænset til 
højest 4 pct., og lån blev traditionelt ydet som personlig kredit uden pant.‖), translation available at 
http://www.brf.dk/C1256A8000376E8E/alldocs/DOCJWIK-5KYKGT (―[Before 1795], the maximum 
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factors limited the supply of credit because of limitations placed on 
incentives for lenders to offer loans. Because of the unsecured basis of 
loans, lenders were given no option to collect on an unpaid loan because 
no collateral had been exchanged in return for the loan.
40
 In Copenhagen, 
with interest rates capped at four percent, the risk involved in lending was 
not adequately compensated for by interest returns, and therefore there 
was a limited supply of such loans offered on the market.
41
 
Yet the devastation caused by the fire called for some kind of action. In 
this case, it was the general public who came up with a solution to the 
crisis. By 1797, a group of wealthy citizens created the first Danish 
mortgage institution: Kreditkassen for Husejerne i København 
(―Kreditkassen‖).42 These loans were secured by a mortgage on real 
property with joint and several liability.
43
 Owners pooled their land assets 
to form ―credit societies,‖44 or ―credit associations.‖45 Against the 
 
 
interest rate was fixed by law at 4%, and financing was traditionally granted as personal loans without 
security.‖).  
 40. This problem can be further illustrated by examining the lack of a mortgage market in Russia 
until as recently as 1998. See Russia’s Mortgage Market Set for Further Growth at Ten Years Old, 
RUSSIA TODAY, July 18, 2008, http://www.russiatoday.com/business/news/27652. There, loans for the 
purchase or improvement of property are unsecured, and therefore, the bank is not given the option of 
foreclosure as a safeguard against a delinquent payer. ―Traditionally, investments in housing [in 
Russia] have been financed by personal savings or loans from family and friends.‖ OLGA MASHKINA, 
PIIA HELISTE & RIITA KOSONEN, HELSINKI SCHOOL OF ECON., THE EMERGING MORTGAGE MARKET 
IN RUSSIA: AN OVERVIEW WITH FOREIGN AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES, at v (2007), available at 
http://hsepubl.lib.hse.fi/pdf/hseother/b82.pdf. When the Law on Privatization of Housing was adopted 
in 1991, very few homes were privatized because of the continued low cost of housing and complex 
procedures. A housing market did not begin to emerge until 1992, when a constitutional amendment 
allowed ―free distribution of housing‖ which, in practice, streamlined procedures for privatization. Id. 
at 2. Further, non-state banks were introduced in 1988. Id. at 6.  
 41. ―The investors considered security to be the most important element in view of this interest 
ceiling and the substantial demand for loans.‖ REALKREDITRÅDET MORTGAGE FINANCING, supra note 
34, at 2.  
 42. BRFkredit.dk, supra note 35. 
 43. REALKREDITRÅDET MORTGAGE FINANCING, supra note 34, at 2. The history of the 
development of the Danish mortgage credit institute, as provided by the mortgage credit institutes 
themselves, describes the loans provided by Kreditkassen for Husejer i København as holding 
mortgagors jointly and severally liable. Id. However, it is unclear how the loans offered through 
Kreditkassen differ significantly from the loans currently offered by mortgage credit institutes. One 
difference is that the loans given out by Kreditkassen were guaranteed by the government whereas 
current mortgages are only privately guaranteed. A. Hein, Vore Kreditforeninger. Deres 
Tilblivelseshistorie [Our Credit Associations. Their Developmental History.], NATIONALØKONOMISK 
TIDSSKRIFT [NATIONAL ECONOMICS MAGAZINE] 409, 413, 419 (1888).  
 44. John T. Bernhard, Empirical Collectivism in Denmark, 13 J. POL. 623, 634 (1951). 
 45. ―Credit association‖ is a literal translation of ―kreditforening.‖ Kreditforening references an 
association of borrowers. However, this is not to be confused with Kreditkassen for Husejere i 
København, which is often referred to as a ―forening af kreditorer,‖ or association of creditors or 
lenders. WESTLUND, supra note 4, at 42. The distinction between ―Kreditkassen for Husejere i 
København‖ and kreditforeninger is emphasized in Hein, supra note 43, at 413 (―[D]enne Kreditkasse 
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combined collateral, loans were granted to the group instead of to 
individual borrowers.
46
 This worked in favor of the owners because the 
association‘s loan rates were lower than rates obtained by owners 
individually.
47
 Not only was more land mortgaged, thus increasing 
foreclosable assets in the event of default, but each owner-member of a 
credit association was also jointly and severally liable for the entirety of 
the mortgage. Thus, there was pressure by the association for an individual 
owner to keep up with his payments.
48
 In addition, there was the guarantee 
that in the case of some defaulters, it did not mean that the entire 
association would default. Thus, the lenders had greater incentive to offer 
mortgages on an associational, rather than on an individual, basis.  
All financing for the loans came in the form of bonds, or negotiable 
debt securities.
49
 This is the root of the Danish balance principle, which 
demands that the amount of bonds sold be equivalent to the amount of 
loans distributed.
50
 The pooling of the properties occurred before 
 
 
var som bemærket ikke en Association af Laantagerne men af Laangiverne . . . .‖). Although the 
creation of Kreditkassen for Husejere i København is often referenced as the inception of the modern 
Danish mortgage market, Kreditkassen was an association of lenders, unlike current mortgage credit 
institutes, which are associations of borrowers. Id. 
 46. The members of the association were held liable for the association‘s debt up to the value of 
their property. ―Medlemmerne hæfter for Foreningens Gæld—med hele Ejendommens 
Taksationsværdi, saafremt Laanet naar de fulde 3/5, og med et forholdsvis mindre Beløb, naar Laanet 
er mindre . . . .‖ C. Thalbitzer, Kreditforening, in 14 SALMONSENS KONVERSATIONS LEKSIKON, 632, 
633 (Chr. Blangstrup ed., 1923), available at http://runeberg.org/salmonsen/2/14/0662.html (access 
page 633 by selecting ―next page‖).  
 47. ―[S]tandardized mortgage[s] backed up by the whole association, of course, dramatically 
reduced the risk for lenders and justified in turn a lower interest rate.‖ Peter Bogason, Strong or Weak 
State? The Case of Danish Agricultural Export Policy, 1849–1906, 24 COMP. POL. 219, 220 (1992). 
The discrepancies in interest rates are still apparent in the current loan market. For example, loans 
granted through mortgage credit institutions have lower interest rates than prioritetslåner, loans that 
are typically granted by commercial banks to cover additional financing for the Homebuyer. See 
FINANCIAL STABILITY 2005, supra note 8, at 19. 
 48. Denmark‘s mortgage credit institutes are often compared to Germany‘s credit cooperatives 
because of the funding of their mortgages through bond issuance and the joint and several liability 
imposed on the mortgagor for the association‘s debt payments. See Hein, supra note 43, at 413 
(Germany‘s system of credit cooperatives influenced the Danish system after 1839.). Observations of 
the application of joint and several liability in Germany‘s system similarly apply to the Danish system: 
―An important feature of the credit cooperatives is that, especially in rural institutions, all of these 
people lived in a small area, interacted regularly, and had many other ties, both economic (such as 
employer / employee) and extra-economic (such as kinship or membership in the same social groups).‖ 
Maitreesh Ghatak & Timothy W. Guinnane, The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory 
and Practice, 60 J. DEV. ECON. 195, 213 (1999).  
 49. BRFkredit.dk, supra note 35 (―[Kreditkassen] finansierede sin virksomhed ved at udstede 
omsættelige gældsbreve (en art pantebreve eller obligationer).‖), translation available at http://www. 
brf.dk/C1256A8000376E8E/alldocs/DOCJWIK-5KYKGT. 
 50. ―[T]he basis [of the housing finance system] is still the balance principle, which requires a 
high degree of accordance between the terms of lending and the issued bonds.‖ Bodil Nyboe 
Andersen, Governor, Danmarks Nationalbanken, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the Association of 
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associations were legally recognized in Danish law in 1849,
51
 but its 
prevalent use to obtain mortgages is arguably one of the reasons why 
associations became legally recognized by 1850.
52
  
In 1849, Denmark became a constitutional monarchy.
53
 While the king 
had the ―final‖ decision of whether the acts of Parliament, the Folketing, 
would be implemented, the monarch was essentially limited to a 
―symbolic and representative‖ role as opposed to a political one.54 Thus, 
the people, through the Folketing, had command over their governance.  
The new Folketing quickly passed the Danish Mortgage Act of 1850.
55
 
For the first time, the Danish mortgage system became codified with legal 
rules. This codification was designed to limit the risk investors took in 
financing mortgage bonds.
56
 The rationale was that reducing risk for 
investors translated to increased investment due to the attractiveness of 
mortgage bonds that could provide solid returns at low risk.
57
 This in turn 
would provide a greater supply of affordable funding options for 
homeowners. Thus, the mortgage credit institutes created by the Danish 
Mortgage Act of 1850 addressed the same problem that its informal 
 
 
Danish Mortgage Banks (Apr. 30, 2003) (transcript available in DANMARKS NATIONALBANK—
MONETARY REVIEW 2ND QUARTER 2003, at 129 (2003), available at http://www.nationalbanken.dk/ 
C1256BE9004F6416/side/Monetary_review_2003_2_Quarter/$file/atr2-03_saml_net.pdf.html) 
[hereinafter Andersen‘s 2003 Speech]. 
 51. HARALD WESTERGAARD, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN DENMARK BEFORE AND DURING THE 
WORLD WAR 16 (1922) (The ―chief aim‖ of the Free Constitution of 1849 was to ―organize the 
community with reference to the free development of the powers of the individual.‖). See Grundloven 
af 05/06/1849, § 92 (―Borgerne have Ret til uden foregaaende Tilladelse at indgaa Foreninger i ethvert 
lovligt Øiemed.‖) [hereinafter Grundloven of 1849], available at http://www.danmarkshistorien. 
dk/leksikon-og-kilder/vis/materiale/danmarks-riges-grundlov-af-5-juni-1849-junigrundloven.  
 52. ―The credit associations . . . grew during the course of the last century and came to occupy an 
extremely strong position.‖ SVEND AAGE HANSEN, EARLY INDUSTRIALISATION IN DENMARK 54 
(1970).  
 53. See Grundloven of 1849, supra note 51, § 1 (―Regjeringsformen er indskrænket-
monarkisk.‖). The English translation of The Constitutional Act of Denmark of June 9, 1953, states in 
Part I, § 2: ―The form of government shall be that of a constitutional monarchy.‖ The Constitutional 
Act of Denmark of June 9, 1953, available at http://www.eu-oplysningen.dk/upload/application/pdf/ 
01726719/ConstitutionofDenmark.pdf. 
 54. Denmark.dk—The Official Website of Denmark, Constitution, http://www.denmark.dk/en/ 
menu/About-Denmark/Government-Politics/Political-System/Constitution (last visited Jan. 16, 2009). 
 55. The Danish Credit Mortgage Act was passed on June 20, 1850. See a listing of all laws 
passed in Denmark between 1660 and 1892, REALREGISTER OVER LOVE OG RESKRIPTER M.M. 1660–
1892, at 843 (1894) (―L[ov] [20. Juni 1850] om Oprettelse af Kreditforeninger og Laanekasser for 
Grundejere.‖). 
 56. ―The main purpose of such legislation [e.g., the Danish Mortgage-Credit Loans Act] is to 
ensure a high level of security for investors in relation to covered bond investments.‖ Nykredit.com, 
Legislation, http://www.nykredit.com/informationsSide.do?iwID=/investorcom/informationsside/B_3_ 
0_0_Legislation.xml (last visited Jan. 31, 2009). 
 57. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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predecessor, Kreditkassen, addressed: availability of affordable loans for 
housing. 
Understood in this light, the Danish Mortgage Act did little to change 
how the system worked.
58
 All it did was put in place state sanctions for 
breaches of the system‘s requirements.59 The Danish Mortgage Act 
―allowed‖ credit unions to be formed where all the members of the union 
had ―mutual liability.‖60 It also codified the balance principle, requiring a 
near 1:1 ratio of bonds on the open market to lending.
61
 
III. OPERATION OF THE DANISH MORTGAGE SYSTEM 
A. The Balance Principle 
The balance principle lies at the core of the Danish mortgage system 
and is legally mandated.
62
 Generally, the balance principle requires that 
terms of payments to holders of mortgage bonds match the terms of the 
actual mortgages that the bonds fund.
63
 ―Compliance with the balance 
 
 
 58. Despite the central role of joint and several liability in mortgages issued by Kreditkassen for 
Husejere i København and other informal credit associations, early legislation allowed the Ministry of 
the Interior (which oversaw the credit associations) to remove the requirement of joint and several 
liability in certain conditions. ―Indenrigsministeriet kan meddele Samtykke til, at de deles i Serier uden 
gjensidigt solidarisk Ansvar, samt til at de optage Interessenter fra andre Landsdele, L. 19 Febr. 1861 
§§ 1, 2 (S. 191).‖ RASMUS EMIL JÜRGENSEN, NYT LOVLEXIKON 453 (1875).  
 59. ―[Lov om d. 20 Juni 1850] var tilvejebragt et godt og sundt Grundlag for Oprettelse af 
Kreditforeninger for alle faste Ejendomme; nu kom det kun an paa, hvorledes Ejendomsbesidderne 
under den foreskrevne Kontrol og Sanktion af Indenrigsministeriet vilde benytte dette Grundlag.‖ 
Hein, supra note 43, at 418–19. 
 60. Governor Jens Thomsen‘s 2006 Speech, supra note 10, at 3. 
 61. By 1861, credit associations gave out mortgages in a series of bonds where joint and several 
liability for the series was imposed on the members of the series, thus subdividing the group of 
persons liable for the loans. ―Kreditforeningerne giver lån i løbende emission, og for at begraense det 
solidariske ansvar blev der i 1861 indført serieinddeling af såvel pantebreve som obligationer, således 
at det solidariske ansvar begraenses til seriens medlemmer.‖ WESTLUND, supra note 4, at 44. For each 
mortgage, there is a covered bond that corresponds to the amount of the mortgage with the same terms. 
―Det samlede beløb af de i hver serie og afdeling cirkulerende obligationer skal være dækket af 
medlemspantebreve til mindst det tilsvarende beløb og med samme vilkår med hensyn til forrentning 
og amortisation.‖ Id. at 55.  
 62. See supra note 3 and accompanying text regarding Danish regulations of the balance 
principle. 
 63. Stig Tørnes-Hansen, Jens Kristian Kimper & Klaus Kristiansen, Denmark, in COVERED 
BONDS BEYOND PFANDBRIEFE: INNOVATIONS, INVESTMENT AND STRUCTURED ALTERNATIVES 113 
(Jonathan Golin ed., 2006): 
[T]he specific parts of the payments on the mortgages, that is, interest and instalments, are 
linked directly and unambiguously to interest payments and redemptions on mortgage bonds 
funding the mortgages. Proceeds from borrowers‘ payments exceeding payments to mortgage 
bond investors must be invested in mortgage loans or used to redeem mortgage bonds in 
circulation within 12 months.  
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principle‖ not only means that the amount of mortgages offered nearly 
matches the amount of mortgage bonds issued, but also ―means every 
single payment on the mortgages is earmarked to specific pools of 
mortgage bonds.‖64 Thus, the mortgage credit institute serves as a ―pass-
through‖65 entity or an intermediary that connects mortgagors with 
investor-lenders. By matching borrowers with investor-lenders, the 
―market risk exposure [and interest rate risk exposure] to the [mortgage 
credit institute] is limited to an absolute minimum.‖66 Adhering to the 
balance principle ensures that mortgage credit institutes‘ risks are confined 
to mortgagors‘ credit risks.67  
A mortgage credit institute is considered to adhere to the balance 
principle as long as it follows the principles of either the ―general balance 
principle‖ or the ―specific balance principle.‖68 Each principle is 
accompanied by a series of tests relating to definition of payments, interest 
risk, exchange-rate risk, option risk, and liquidity risk.
69
 
B. The Danish Mortgage Bond Market 
Callable annuity bonds are the traditional type of bonds issued in the 
Danish mortgage bond market.
70
 The income from the purchase of bonds 
serves as the loan capital disbursed to borrowers. When the borrower 
repays the loan with interest, the interest is paid to the bond-holder, 
typically biannually or quarterly.
71
 The bonds have a set maturity date, 
usually ten, fifteen, twenty, or thirty years.
72
 Each bond has an ―embedded 
call option,‖73 meaning that at any time prior to the bond‘s maturity date, 
 
 
 64. Id.  
 65. The term ―pass-through‖ is also used to refer to the fact that the ―[mortgage credit institute 
must] have sufficient liquidity to meet all future payments on mortgage bonds issued, hence, it will not 
depend on future funding markets in order to pay mortgage bond investors in due time.‖ Id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. ―Balanceprincippet sikrer, at realkreditinstitutterne ikke påføres en renterisiko. Institutternes 
risiko er således begrænset til den egentlige kreditrisiko, hvilket vil sige risikoen for manglende rente- 
og afdragsbetalinger fra låntager samt ejendomsvurderingens overensstemmelse med 
lånetilgodehavendet.‖ REALKREDITRÅDET, REALKREDIT FINANSIERING I DANMARK 23 (2005), http:// 
realkredit.net.dynamicweb.dk/Files/Filer/pdf/Publikationer/Realkreditfinansiering_i_DK05_RKR_040
208.pdf. 
 68. DANISH MORTGAGE BONDS, supra note 7, at 10.  
 69. For the specific risk criteria that mortgage credit institutes must follow, see id. at 11.  
 70. Id. at 21. 
 71. ―Borrowers‘ interest payments and redemptions made on the payment dates are distributed to 
investors corresponding to the percentage of bonds drawn so that any investor‘s holding in a given 
bond series will correspond to the overall percentage of bonds drawn in that series.‖ Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  
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the mortgage credit institute could call back, at par,
74
 the bond from the 
bond-holder. This means that a mortgagor may make advance payments 
on his loan by requesting that the mortgage institute call back bonds worth 
an equivalent amount of his prepayment.
75
 Because of the transaction 
costs
76
 associated with this process, in addition to ensuring that bond 
coupon payments are made to the investor-lender, the borrower is limited 
to having the bonds called only on the quarterly payment dates to the 
bond-holder, and must provide at least two months‘ notice to the mortgage 
credit institute of their prepayment.
77
 
For example, a mortgagor could exercise her call option during the life 
of the mortgage when current interest rates drop after obtaining the 
mortgage. Thus, because her original bonds came with a higher interest 
rate, those bonds would understandably have a greater net present value 
(―NPV‖) than current bonds being issued. Consequently, if the borrower 
calls back her bonds by prepaying with funds from a new loan, the 
borrower‘s new loan must be based on bonds amounting to the same 
value. Because the new bonds have a lower interest rate and hence, a 
lower market value, more bonds would need to underlie her new loan in 
order to adequately compensate for the calling of her original, higher-
valued, bonds. This plan results in an increase in principal borrowed, but 
lower interest payments.
78
 Effectively, under this arrangement, the overall 
payments made by the borrower are lower than in the case where she had 
 
 
 74. Id.  
 75. The Danish and American mortgage markets are ―globally exceptional‖ in their allowance of 
penalty-free mortgage prepayment. Allen Frankel, Jacob Gyntelberg, Kristian Kjeldsen, & Mattias 
Persson, The Danish Mortgage Market: As Housing Finance Evolves, Are There Reasons to Follow 
the Danish Model?, BIS [Bank for International Settlements] Q. REV., Mar. 2004, at 95. One of the 
key differences between the two systems, however, is that the risk that prepayment poses to the market 
(less interest is being paid to the lender) is borne by the bondholder in Denmark, whereas in the United 
States, it is borne by the lending institution. Id. at 96. The Danish balance principle is responsible for 
this difference in risk allocation. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 76. ―There are both fixed and variable transaction costs associated with exercising [the call or 
delivery] options.‖ Kourosh Marjani Rasmussen & Jens Clausen, Mortgage Loan Portfolio 
Optimization Using Multi-Stage Stochastic Programming, 31 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 742, 
743 (2007). 
 77. ―The required notice of prepayment is two months before the next coupon date (five months 
for some older mortgage bonds).‖ NYKREDIT, THE DANISH MORTGAGE BOND MARKET 19 (2006), 
http://www.nykredit.com/investorcom/ressourcer/dokumenter/pdf/B_7_6_2_2_The%20_Danish_mort
gage_bond_market_by_Nykredit.pdf [hereinafter THE DANISH MORTGAGE BOND MARKET].  
 78. ―When the interest rates are low the call option can be used to obtain a new loan with less 
interest payment in exchange for an increase in the amount of outstanding debt.‖ Rasmussen & 
Clausen, supra note 76, at 743. 
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not exercised her call option.
79
 Since the embedded call option primarily 
benefits the borrower and places bond-holders in positions of investment 
uncertainty, allowing calls only a few times a year decreases risk to bond-
holders while maintaining flexibility for mortgagors to build equity in 
their homes, thereby reducing credit risk in the entire system. 
Another type of action available to the borrower is the delivery 
option.
80
 At any time during the duration of the loan, a borrower may 
exercise her delivery option by buying the bonds underlying her mortgage 
and delivering them to the mortgage credit institute. This option is often 
used when the current interest rates are higher than the interest rate at 
which the borrower originally obtained her mortgage.
81
 In this situation, 
the underlying mortgage bonds have a lower NPV than bonds currently 
being issued because the investment return is less due to its lower interest 
rate. When these bonds are bought at market prices by the borrower, she 
may be able to pay a discounted price because of the lower NPV.
82
 Thus, 
the amount of funds needed to buy the original bonds on the open market 
may be less than the original cost of the bonds when they were first 
issued.
83
 If the borrower finances the bond purchase with a new loan, the 
borrower is essentially exchanging her old loan for a new one that is based 
on a smaller principal, albeit with a higher interest rate. Additionally, the 
maturity dates for the underlying bonds of the new loan would be fifteen 
or thirty years from the date of issuance. Thus, the extended payback 
period combined with the lower principal loan value might offset the 
higher interest rate and result in lower monthly payments for the borrower, 
though it may cause a net increase in the total amount paid by the 
borrower if the bond is paid to maturity.
84
  
 
 
 79.  
The borrower will receive a gain in the form of lower future net payments and thus lower 
first-year net payments owing to the lower interest rate. However, this type of remortgaging 
typically results in an increase of the outstanding debt, depending on the price of the bonds 
underlying the new loan.  
DANISH MORTGAGE BONDS, supra note 7, at 32.  
 80. Rasmussen & Clausen, supra note 76, at 743. This option is also referred to as the buyback 
option. Svenstrup & Willemann, supra note 6, at 106.  
 81. DANISH MORTGAGE BONDS, supra note 7, at 32.  
 82. How much of a discount the borrower receives depends on the market price of the underlying 
bonds. Should investors be unwilling to sell, the demand for such bonds may raise the market price. 
See THE DANISH MORTGAGE BOND MARKET, supra note 77, at 6 (―If no investors are prepared to sell, 
borrowers may be forced to pay a high price for buying back their bonds, and small illiquid bonds are 
therefore often expensively priced in the Danish mortgage bond market.‖).  
 83. This is based on the assumption that due to the change in interest rates, ―borrowers may buy 
back their bonds . . . at lower prices than when their loans originated.‖ Tørnes-Hansen et al., supra 
note 63, at 104.  
 84. ―Borrowers initially achieve a reduction of their outstanding debt at the expense of higher 
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Since the borrower often obtains the funds to buy the underlying bonds 
through a new mortgage, the delivery option and call options appear to 
operate similarly. The fundamental difference, however, is that the 
delivery option allows for bond redemption at market price, instead of at 
par (as with the call option) or some other pre-determined rate. The 
delivery option imposes no additional investment risk upon the bond-
holder and allows the mortgagor to take advantage of lower market 
prices.
85
  
IV. REGULATORY CHANGE OF THE MORTGAGE SYSTEM AS A 
MACROECONOMIC TOOL 
The credit associations established by the Danish Mortgage Act of 
1850 had a cap on the loan-to-value (―LTV‖) ratio at sixty percent.86 Thus, 
while the Act‘s goal was to increase the availability of loans to consumers, 
it limited the quantum of the loan per consumer. This was probably 
necessary in order to bolster the security guaranteeing the loan—that a 
foreclosure on a property would provide more than sufficient funds to 
cover the remainder of the loan.
87
 
However, the low LTV ratio offered by the credit associations created a 
need for secondary loan markets to supplement the remaining forty percent 
of the property value that was uncovered by the loan.
88
 The first second-
mortgage institute was established in 1895.
89
 The 1936 Act on Second 
Mortgage Institutions allowed the overall LTV ratio available for 
consumers to rise to seventy-five percent,
90
 and put the institutes under the 
 
 
payments, which they hope to be able to reduce by remortgaging to a lower coupon at a later date.‖ 
DANISH MORTGAGE BONDS, supra note 7, at 32. 
 85. The mortgage market in the United States does not allow for prepayments based on a 
delivery option. See Svenstrup & Willemann, supra note 6, at 107 (comparing the methods of 
mortgage prepayment in the United States and in Denmark). 
 86. ―Som Hovedgrundlag for K.‘s Virksomhed maa nævnes Bestemmelsen om, at de kan give 
Laan indtil 3/5 af Ejendommens Taksationsværdi . . . .‖ Thalbitzer, supra note 46, at 633. 
 87. See supra note 46 and accompanying text regarding initial rules on the securitization of 
mortgage loans with property. 
 88. See Governor Jens Thomsen‘s 2006 Speech, supra note 10, at 3.  
 89. Realkreditraadet.dk, Realkredittens historie [Mortgage aid history], http://www. 
realkreditraadet.dk/Branchen/Realkredittens_historie.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) (―Den første 
hypotekforening blev stiftet i 1895 . . . .‖). 
 90. ―De af en Købstadhypotekforening bevilgede Laan udmaales af Direktionen under passende 
Hensyntagen til Laanets Rentefod og saaledes, at de med Tillæg af foranstaaende Behæftelser ikke 
maa overstige 3/4 af den Vurdering, der er lagt til Grund for Laanet.‖ LOV Nr. 108 om 
Købstadshypotekforeninger, af 7/04/1936, § 14 Stk 1, available at http://www.logir.fo/foldb/lov/1936/ 
0000108.htm. See also REALKREDITRÅDET MORTGAGE FINANCING, supra note 34, at 2.  
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supervision of the Ministry of the Interior.
91
 Other secondary (or tertiary) 
mortgage institutes were established in 1959, increasing the effective LTV 
ratio for consumers to ninety-five percent.
92
 ―The process up to this point 
could be seen as a prolonged period of financial liberalisation and 
innovation.‖93 The increasing impact of global markets on the Danish 
economy would soon alter this very careful construction of mortgage 
loans. 
A. The Potato Diet Years 
The change in the Danish mortgage market in the 1970s should be 
understood in the context of the world‘s economic situation at the time.94  
The performance of the Danish economy was very poor between 
1973 and 1980 . . . .  
 The economic costs were a low growth rate, little investment, 
high unemployment, high inflation and record interest rates and 
deficits on the balance of payments . . . . The measures of economic 
performance were in most years worse than those for the majority of 
other West European countries.
95
  
 With this backdrop, the Danish government decided to ―tighten up the 
rules of the game‖ and used the Mortgage Credit Reform of 1970 as a 
―macroeconomic policy instrument.‖96 The reforms eliminated secondary 
and tertiary mortgage markets,
97
 effectively reducing the LTV ratio limits 
available to consumers. The reforms also reduced maturity limits on 
mortgage bonds to a maximum of thirty years
98
 and disallowed mortgage 
 
 
 91. ―Indenrigsministeriet fører Tilsyn med Købstadhypotekforeningernes Laaneniveau og i 
øvrigt med Overholdelsen af de i nærværende Lov givne Forskrifter.‖ LOV Nr. 108, supra note 90, § 8 
Stk 1.  
 92. Governor Jens Thomsen‘s 2006 Speech, supra note 10, at 3.  
 93. Id. 
 94. During the 1970s, the United States incurred an increasing amount of debt because of its 
involvement in the Vietnam War, the energy crisis, and other socio-political reasons. See President 
Jimmy Carter, Speech Given on the Energy Crisis (Feb. 1, 1977) (transcript available at 
http://globalpublicmedia.com/transcripts/426) (discussing the ―worst economic slowdown of the last 
40 years.‖). 
 95. HANS CHRISTIAN JOHANSEN, THE DANISH ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 165 
(1987). 
 96. Governor Jens Thomsen‘s 2006 Speech, supra note 10, at 3. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Ulrik Knudsen & Michael Sand, Developments in the Danish Bond Market since 1970, in 
DANMARKS NATIONALBANK—MONETARY REVIEW 1ST QUARTER 2004, at 35, 37 Box 1 (2004), 
available at http://www.nationalbanken.dk/C1256BE9004F6416/side/Monetary-review_2004_1_ 
Quarter/$file/MON0104.pdf.  
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2010] DANISH MORTGAGE REGULATIONS 387 
 
 
 
 
equity withdrawal.
99
 One of the purposes for the changes may have been to 
reduce market volatility by reducing the use of the call or delivery options 
on bonds to extract equity. Removing even one motivation for exercising 
these options arguably provided some relative calm to the system by 
dissuading excessive trading. In addition, the changes imposed on the 
mortgage system effectively forced Danish citizens into lifestyle changes, 
thereby causing shifts in the economy. These macroeconomic uses of 
mortgage reform policies are best illustrated during the mid-1980s to 
1990s when Denmark was still affected by the balance-of-payments crisis 
sparked by the 1973 war in the Middle East and rise in oil prices.
100
 
The ―Potato Diet‖101 refers to the economic policies adopted in 
Denmark between 1986 and 1993.
102
 Changes to Danish mortgage 
regulations during this time included a cap on maturity rates for existing 
and new properties. For existing properties, bonds had to mature within 
twenty years.
103
 For new properties, bonds had a maximum thirty-year 
maturity.
104
 Furthermore, the amortization schedules throughout the 
maturity period were changed to charge greater interest in the initial years 
than had been charged under previous mortgage regulations.
105
 
The effect of these changes—maturity periods and the shift in 
amortization schedules—forced Danes to examine more carefully their 
debt load. Existing property owners could not exercise their delivery 
option to decrease their overall monthly payment by reducing the loan 
principal, but they could increase their interest payments through an 
extended payment period. Thus, the limitation on a twenty-year maturity 
period reduced the volume of refinanced loans through the exercise of the 
delivery option, leaving less ―new‖ debt to be incurred.106  
The thirty-year capped maturity period for new properties 
accomplishes the same goals as the twenty-year capped maturity period for 
existing properties. Without a longer maturity period, borrowers would 
 
 
 99. See Governor Jens Thomsen‘s 2006 Speech, supra note 10, at 3. Further, the number of 
mortgage credit institutes available was reduced from over a dozen to just four through mergers of the 
institute. Id.; see also STATENS ARKIVER—ERHVERVSARKIVET, KREDITFORENINGSARKIVER: HVAD 
FINDER DU I LÅNESAGER OG VURDERINGSRAPPORTER? 2, http://www.sa.dk/media(392,1030)/ 
Kreditforeningsarkiver.pdf. 
 100. JOHANSEN, supra note 95, at 165. 
 101. The term refers to tight financial situations that are often associated with austere diets.  
 102. See Governor Jens Thomsen‘s 2006 Speech, supra note 10, at 3–4. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Denmark‘s balance of payments deficit had doubled by 1974, and doubled yet again by 1979. 
JOHANSEN, supra note 95, at 165–67. 
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have to be more conscious of their overall borrowing limits because 
monthly payments could not be reduced simply by refinancing balances 
and extending maturity dates. Further, by limiting the variances in the 
characteristics and types of mortgage bonds available on the market by 
setting definite caps, investor confidence in the system might grow, thus 
increasing stability in the system. 
Altering the amortization schedules also allowed for increased stability 
in the market. With more interest charged initially, the average borrower 
would accumulate equity in his home more slowly. At the same time, 
equity withdrawal was disincentivized, leading to a reduction in 
Denmark‘s debt volume.  
As the nation‘s debt decreased, thereby reducing the balance-of-
payment deficit, household savings increased vis-à-vis equity building. 
This resulted in a decrease in prepayment risk for bondholders, bolstering 
system stability. In this manner, Danish mortgage regulations effectively 
controlled public savings patterns.
107
 Further, these measures combated 
inflation in the housing market: due to the added regulations, the volume 
of houses bought during the period fell, eventually causing a thirty percent 
decrease in the price of housing.
108
 By 1993, equity withdrawal was again 
permitted up to an eighty percent LTV ratio.
109
 
A key factor in the local economy‘s reactions was that at the time, the 
Danish mortgage market was a relatively closed system. The influence of 
global markets had not yet become so forceful that it would dilute the 
regulatory impact on consumer and local investor decisions. Presently, 
however, because of the inextricability of global market influence on the 
Danish mortgage system, the system can no longer be used as a 
macroeconomic policy tool as it had been during the Potato Diet Years.
110
  
 
 
 107. Consumption rates fell during this period. See Governor Jens Thomsen‘s 2006 Speech, supra 
note 10, at 4. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. ―Since [1993], mortgage credit parameters have not really been used as macroeconomic 
policy tools, partly because the internationalisation of the financial sector make any attempts at 
quantitative controls easy to circumvent through cross-border lending.‖ See Governor Jens Thomsen‘s 
2006 Speech, supra note 10, at 4. Additionally, Denmark became a member of the European 
Economic Community (―EEC‖), the predecessor to the European Union (―EU‖), in 1973. 
Udenrigsministeriet—Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark and the World, http:// 
www.um.dk/publikationer/um/english/factsheetdenmark/denmarkanoverview/html/chapter07.htm (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2009). This facet of external supranational oversight has also hindered the use of 
mortgage regulations as a macroeconomic policy tool. While EEC directives regarding securities have 
been applicable since 1985, recent EU legislation is now directed squarely at the covered bond market 
and credit institutions. See Council Directive 85/611, 1985 O.J. (L375) 3, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu; see also Directive 2001/108, art. 22 (4), 2002 O.J. (LO41) 35, available at http://eur-
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B. Post-Potato Diet Reforms and Current Regulation 
Reforms continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s in efforts to 
stabilize the economy.
111
 One of the main legislative reforms came in 1989 
when new mortgage banks formed and the reorganization of already-
established mortgage institutes as limited liability companies was 
allowed.
112
  
Since the end of the Potato Diet Years in 1993, new mortgage types 
have been introduced. These include deferred-amortization mortgages,
113
 
introduced in October 2003,
114
 which allow for interest-only payments to 
be made for up to ten years before a typical amortization schedule is 
imposed on the principal for the remaining duration of the maturity 
period.
115
 In addition to traditional fixed-rate mortgages, floating-rate 
mortgages were introduced in 1996.
116
 The rates for these mortgages are 
not fixed and are based on prevailing market rates. A variation of this type 
of mortgage is the floating-rate mortgage with a cap on the highest-
possible rate chargeable.
117
 This variation was introduced in late 2004.
118
  
 
 
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:041:0035:0042:EN:PDF (amending Council 
Directive 85/611); Council Directive 2006/49, 2006 O.J. (L177) 201, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2006L0049:20080320:EN:PDF (regarding 
the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions); Council Directive 2006/48, 2006 O.J. 
(L177) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2006L00 
48:20080321:EN:PDF (regarding the establishment and function of credit institutions). For a summary 
of Denmark‘s implementation of these directives, see Lotte Bomgaard, Covered Bonds—EU 
Regulations and New Danish Legislation, NYKREDIT, Mar. 1, 2007, http://www.nykredit.com/ 
investorcom/ressourcer/dokumenter/pdf/B_7_6_6_1_NYKREDIT_EU_REGULATIONS_NEW_DANIS
H_LEGISLATION.pdf. The Association of Danish Mortgage Banks opened a branch office in Brussels 
in 2005 ―to be centrally placed around EU institutions and to be able to influence EU initiatives in the 
mortgage sector.‖ BANKS IN BRUSSELS, supra note 13, at 5.  
 111. For a chronological summary of changes to the Danish bond market since 1970, see Knudsen 
& Sand, supra note 98, at 37 Box 1. 
 112. Mikkel Svenstrup, Mortgage Choice—The Danish Case 2 (Arhaus Sch. of Bus. Working 
Paper, 2002), available at http://research.asb.dk/fbspretrieve/265/D02_22.pdf. Mortgage banks could 
provide the same types of loans as mortgage credit institutes. See REALKREDITRÅDET MORTGAGE 
FINANCING, supra note 34, at 3; see also Douglas B. Diamond, Jr. & Michael J. Lea, Denmark, 3 J. 
HOUSING RES. 16 (1992).  
 113. Knudsen & Sand, supra note 98, at 35, 37 Box 1.  
 114. FINANCIAL STABILITY 2005, supra note 8, at 31. 
 115. Id. at 49. 
 116. KATHLEEN SCANLON & CHRISTINE WHITEHEAD, COUNCIL OF MORTGAGE LENDERS, 
INTERNATIONAL TRENDS IN HOUSING TENURE AND MORTGAGE FINANCE 77 (2004), http://www.cml. 
org.uk/cml/filegrab/pdf_pub_resreps_51full.pdf.pdf?ref=3870.  
 117. The floating mortgage rate and the interest rate cap, or guarantee, are sold as separate 
products to ensure that the bond products underlying the floating mortgage rate are kept as ―simple and 
liquid‖ as possible. Svenstrup, supra note 112, at 12.  
 118. See FINANCIAL STABILITY 2005, supra note 8, at 31. 
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These variations on floating rate mortgages, also known as adjustable 
rate mortgages (―ARMs‖), outpaced traditional fixed-rate loans every 
month of 2004.
119
 ARMs financed through banks have increasingly taken 
up market share.
120
 From January 2004 to January 2005, banks more than 
doubled their market share,
121
 predominantly because of the marked 
increase in the distribution of ARMs.
122
 For a system that has a tradition of 
being risk-averse, the increased use of ARMs did not necessarily alarm 
financial analysts. Rather, Nationalbanken‘s ―Financial Stability 2005‖ 
report stated that the use of ARMs increased through higher-income 
brackets, while lower-income households predominantly used fixed-rate 
mortgages.
123
 Thus, the relative credit risk of mortgage loans did not 
increase. The loans susceptible to greater interest rate risk are distributed 
primarily to borrowers who can afford to pay potential increases in their 
monthly payments due to increased market rates. Consequently, the 
availability of the higher-risk mortgages did not impact the relative risk of 
default on payment to the bond-holders, but it allowed greater flexibility 
of investment options to those with higher incomes. Moreover, because 
those with lesser incomes primarily purchased less risky mortgages, the 
combined empirical evidence showed that the industry was doing a good 
job of providing professional advice.
124
 
The Danish Mortgage Act was amended by the ―Danish Mortgage 
Loans and Mortgage Bonds Act‖ in 2003.125 Provisions from the Danish 
Mortgage Act that were not included in the Danish Mortgage Loans and 
Mortgage Bonds Act were incorporated into the Danish Financial Services 
Act that entered into force in 2004.
126
 Some of the major provisions of the 
2003 Danish Mortgage Loans and Mortgage Bonds Act include: 
 
 
 119. See id. at 47. 
 120. ―[Since 1996] non-callable bullet bonds make up more than 40 per cent of total market 
volume.‖ Tørnes-Hansen et al., supra note 63, at 101. 
 121. See FINANCIAL STABILITY 2005, supra note 8, at 48, chart 28. 
 122. ―This growth is mainly attributable to the introduction, in the 2nd half of 2003, of adjustable-
rate bank mortgage loans to homeowners as an alternative to traditional capital-market financing via 
mortgage-credit institutes.‖ Id. at 49.  
 123. See id. at 81, chart 41.  
 124. Governor Jens Thomsen‘s 2006 Speech, supra note 10, at 5. Researchers of the factors 
leading to the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States would find this kind of self-imposed 
oversight or reflection regarding adequate education of consumers and analysis of empirical data that 
supports the likelihood of adequate education missing from our system. 
 125. See LOV Nr. 454, supra note 3. See also the unofficial English translation of Act. No. 454, 
supra note 3. 
 126. BRFkredit.dk, supra note 35. For Danish and unofficial English translations of these acts, see 
BRFkredit.dk, About the Danish Mortgage Credit System, http://www.brf.dk/C1256A8000376E8E/ 
alldocs/DOCJWIK-5L7F44 (follow ―The Danish Mortgage Loans and Mortgage Bonds Act (English 
translation)‖ hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 13, 2009); id. (follow ―The Danish Mortgage Loans and 
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(1) The loan-to-value cap is 80 percent for owner-occupied all-year 
residences and other types of residences.
127
 Other caps are set forth 
for other types of properties.
128
 
(2) Estimated value on the real property used for the mortgage will 
reflect ―the amount that an experienced buyer with knowledge about 
price conditions and market conditions for the relevant type of real 
property would be deemed to be willing to pay for said property 
(market value)‖129 and account for any risk of changes in market 
conditions. Additionally, ―[c]onditions which occasion a 
particularly high price shall not be taken into consideration during 
 
 
Mortgage Bonds (Danish version)‖ hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 13, 2009); id. (follow ―The Danish 
Financial Services Act (English translation)‖ hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 13, 2009); id. (follow ―The 
Danish Financial Services Act (Danish version)‖ hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 13, 2009). The May 2001 
Financial Services Act includes regulations on code of conduct, transfer of customer information, 
ownership, management, and statement of accounts. Realkreditraadet.dk, The Danish Mortgage 
Legislation, http://www.realkreditraadet.dk/Mortgage_financing/The_Danish_Mortgage_Legislation. 
aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2008). Both of these Acts were revised in 2007. See LOV Nr. 577, om 
ændring af lov om finansiel virksomhed og forskellige andre love, af 10/06/2007, available at 
https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=27608. See BEK Nr. 718, Bekendtgørelse om 
obligationsudstedelse, balanceprincip og risikostyring, af 21/06/2007, available at https://www. 
retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=27640. For unofficial English translations of both acts, see 
http://www.nykredit.com/investorcom/ressourcer/dokumenter/pdf/Annexes.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 
2009). However, as the amendments primarily deal with the function and operation of mortgage banks, 
this paper will refer to the Acts of 2003. 
 127. LOV Nr. 454, supra note 3, § 5:  
Inden for en lånegrænse på 80 pct. af ejendommens værdi kan der ydes lån til følgende 
ejendomskategorier:  
 (1) Ejerboliger til helårsbrug.  
 (2) Private andelsboliger.  
 (3) Private beboelsesejendomme til udlejning.  
 (4) Alment boligbyggeri.  
 (5) Ungdomsboliger.  
 (6) Ældreboliger m.v.  
 (7) Ejendomme til sociale, kulturelle og undervisningsmæssige formål. 
An unofficial English translation of the text reads:  
Within a lending limit of 80 per cent [sic] of the value of the property, loans may be granted 
for the following categories of property:  
 (1) Owner-occupied all-year residences,  
 (2) Private co-operative housing,  
 (3) Private housing for letting,  
 (4) Non-profit rental housing,  
 (5) Youth housing,  
 (6) Housing for the elderly etc., and  
 (7) Properties for social, cultural, and educational purposes.  
Unofficial English translation of Act. No. 454, supra note 3, § 5. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. § 10 Stk. 1–2. 
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valuation.‖130 Mortgage credit institutions may deviate from these 
rules in certain circumstances that do not involve owner-occupied 
residences.
131
 
(3) Reinforcement of the balance principle by limiting investments 
using funds raised by the issue of mortgage credit bonds to lending 
against mortgages on real property.
132
 
 These are recodifications of basic foundational principles of the 
Danish mortgage market, but the Act reflects the marked increase in the 
use of ARMs. On the one hand, the reinforcement of basic principles 
grounds the types of mortgage products that can be created by the 
mortgage credit institutes. On the other, the Act recognizes the prevalence 
of ARMs and includes provisions to ensure that their issuance is not at 
odds with the structural adherence to the Balance Principle.
133
  
With lower loan-to-value ratios for loan approval and the added 
volatility of floating mortgages, the credit risk of borrowers has increased. 
The guarantee of the loan by the land value eroded because values were 
inflated due to the housing bubble and the increased borrowing against 
property value. The mortgage credit associations in Denmark thrived from 
the Act‘s inception because of its careful review of risk aversion—
historically, the joint and several liability of the association‘s members 
reduced the credit risk of the members individually, and the low LTV 
 
 
 130. LOV Nr. 454, supra note 3, § 10 Stk. 3. 
Realkreditinstituttet skal ansætte en kontantværdi af ejendommen til brug for låneudmålingen.  
Stk. 2. Værdien skal ligge inden for det beløb, som en kyndig erhverver med kendskab til 
pris- og markedsforholdene for den pågældende type ejendom må skønnes at ville betale for 
ejendommen (markedsværdi). Forhold, der betinger en særlig høj pris, må ikke indgå i 
værdiansættelsen.  
Stk. 3. Rea Realkreditinstituttet skal ved værdiansættelsen tage hensyn til eventuel risiko for 
ændringer i markeds- eller strukturforhold.  
Id. § 10 Stk. 1–3. 
 131. Id. § 10 Stk. 4. (granting allowances from the regulations in Part 10 for loans for non-profit 
rental housing, subsidized private cooperative housing, properties for social, cultural, and educational 
purposes). 
 132. Id. § 20 Stk. 1: 
Midler fremkommet ved udstedelse af realkreditobligationer eller andre værdipapirer kan 
alene anvendes til udlån mod pant i fast ejendom, jf. dog stk. 2 og 3. 
Exceptions to § 20 Stk. 1 are allowed under the discretion of the Danish Financial Supervisory 
Authority. See id. § 20 Stk. 2–3. The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority also has discretion to 
decide upon regulation of interest risk, redemption terms, and other return on investment allowances. 
Id. § 21.  
 133. See The Statutory Basis for the Financial Sector, in DANMARKS NATIONALBANK—REPORT 
AND ACCOUNTS 2003, at 151 (2003), available at http://www.nationalbanken.dk/C1256BE9004F6416/ 
side/Report_and_accounts_2003/$file/aar_uk_03_web.pdf. 
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ratios virtually guaranteed that the loan would be repaid by foreclosure on 
the property in the event of default. The deviation from these core aspects 
of the Danish market‘s foundation, combined with new European Union 
directives, prompted the Folketing to adjust the Danish Mortgage Act to 
promote, but regulate per the Balance Principle, the creation of new 
mortgage products based on ARMs.
134
  
Yet, such a ―reining in‖ did not stir the mortgage market negatively. 
Rather, ―[s]ince the overall mortgage credit market has expanded, the 
development of new types of loans, and the corresponding new mortgage 
bonds, has not translated into a reduction of the outstanding stock of 
traditional callable fixed-rate mortgage bonds, where the most liquid 
issues are concentrated.‖135 This is indicative that mortgages with more 
lenient loan-to-value ratios that were sold prior to the change in legislation 
were being sold to those who could actually afford them. In other words, 
the mortgagor could have only borrowed eighty percent of the value of the 
property, but opted for a higher loan-to-value ratio to better leverage her 
assets. It was not a matter of insufficient funds, but rather of how Danes 
had chosen to allocate their funds during the housing boom.  
It is noticeable in hindsight that the amendments to the Danish 
Mortgage Act occurred in 2003. While most of the world, including the 
United States, continued to see a dramatic rise in housing prices, property 
values, and economic growth, the Danes had quietly shifted the rules and 
infrastructure of their mortgage market to cope with the potential pitfalls 
of market risk. The Folketing implemented its wisdom of calculated risk 
aversion by mandating in the Act that a mortgage credit institution be 
mindful of market conditions (such as property valuation) that were 
unstable or could produce unnaturally high market prices. The portentous 
action by the Danish government may have been the reason why lasting 
damage to the system was averted. 
The Folketing‘s protectionist attitude over its mortgage market is well 
founded. Over the past two hundred years, Denmark has formulated one of 
the most efficiently run domestic mortgage markets in the world. Its 
 
 
 134. The 2007 amendments address the issuance of some types of covered bonds (―SDOs‖) that 
are funded differently from traditional mortgage bonds, but still operate by using property as collateral. 
One of the main differences between the two types of bonds is that the LTV ratio limits on SDOs must 
be adhered to for the entire life of the loan. Thus, if property prices decline, thus increasing the LTV 
ratio, the mortgage credit institute must offer additional collateral to bring the LTV ratio back within 
bounds. This reduces investment risk for the bondholder, especially in times of volatile housing prices. 
DLR KREDIT, ANNUAL REPORT 2008: 8TH FINANCIAL YEAR 10 (2008), https://newsclient.omxgroup. 
com/cds/DisclosureAttachmentServlet?messageAttachmentId=212544. 
 135. THE DANISH MORTGAGE MARKET—A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 12. 
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citizens are well educated in their housing finance options, which has 
helped the personal wealth of Danes to grow through residential real estate 
investment, whether or not the property is occupied. The securities issued 
on the domestic and world markets are highly valued and respected. 
Denmark has not only cultivated an image of domestic economic stability, 
but it offers a beacon of stability for the rest of the world as well. The 
Danish mortgage market is a prime example of an economically successful 
system that can produce large returns for its populace through increased 
stability in housing availability and affordability
136
 and its creation of a 
marketable, viable investment product.  
V. 2008 FINANCIAL STATUS OF DENMARK VIS-À-VIS MORTGAGE-CREDIT 
BONDS 
Denmark does not have a ―subprime‖ market comparable to that in the 
United States.
137
 However, the Danish mortgage bond market has been 
labeled ―exotic‖ as recently as April 22, 1999.138 This labeling of the 
Danish mortgage bond market may be for no other reason than its 
complexity and uniqueness as opposed to its novelty or illegality. Because 
of its incomprehensibility and strangeness to international investors, 
changes to regulations of the Danish mortgage system have been 
influenced by the need to make Danish mortgage bonds more appealing to 
foreign investors. This need translated to a desire by mortgage-credit 
institutes to relax the ―balance principle.‖ 139 
In 2003, Nationalbanken‘s Governor Bodil Nyboe Andersen 
commented on the relaxation of the balance principle:  
Over the years, the mortgage-credit sector has often suggested that 
the balance principle be removed, or at any rate softened 
considerably.  
 Danmarks Nationalbank has always advised against a more than 
marginal relaxation. The balance principle is important to 
 
 
 136. Subsidized housing is available for those in need, allowing people to save until a point in 
time when they can qualify to purchase a home. 
 137. DANMARKS NATIONALBANK, FINANCIAL STABILITY 2008, at 11 n.1 (2008), available at 
http://www.nationalbanken.dk/C1256BE9004F6416/side/DF4F96A8070AA8C2C125744A002B6506/
$file/FinancialStability_2008.pdf. 
 138. Governor Jens Thomsen‘s 2006 Speech, supra note 10, at 1. 
 139. Bodil Nyboe Andersen, Governor, Danmarks Nationalbanken, Speech at the Annual Meeting 
of the Association of Danish Mortgage Banks (Apr. 22, 1999) (transcript available at http://www. 
governmentdebt.dk/dnuk/pressroom.nsf/side/Annual_Meeting_of_the_Association_of_Danish_Mortga
ge_Banks_on_22_April_1999!OpenDocument). 
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maintaining the blue-chip status of the bonds and has a great deal of 
the credit for the very high rating enjoyed by Danish mortgage-
credit bonds. The balance principle is fundamentally a very simple 
way of managing risk.  
 The mortgage-credit product may not be very exciting, but it is a 
good, simple and inexpensive product that gives even small 
borrowers the opportunity to finance homes and businesses on 
financial-market terms.
140
 
 However, despite this view of the value of the balance principle as a 
stalwart for stability and risk-limitation, the post-Potato Diet Years‘ 
liberalization principles inaugurated in 1993, which brought with them a 
greater variety of loan options, were meant to stimulate growth. Growth is 
stimulated by attracting new consumers, many of whom bring added risk 
but in untraditional forms. An example of this is the higher-income person 
who purchases a home on a fixed-rate mortgage, but then, because of the 
increased variety of loan options, decides to purchase a summer home 
using an ARM. This added higher-risk ARM imposes a risk of default not 
only on one loan, but on two. 
Further, following lean economic times, it was this liberalization that 
allowed Denmark‘s economy to come out of the doldrums. Homeowners 
who faced financial difficulties now had the option to refinance their 
homes under different mortgage programs and withdraw the equity that 
they had acquired. Because these homeowners exercised this ―self-help‖ 
option, ―society was spared many problems‖141 such as an increase in the 
mortgage loan default rate, unemployment, homelessness, and overall 
economic instability. Additionally, society positively benefited from the 
spurred economic growth resulting from the liberalization policies. Thus, 
the impetus for allowing the new mortgage products was to stimulate 
economic growth. 
Yet the advent of rising interest rates and a decline in homeowners‘ net 
income created an environment of vulnerability and instability. The 
financial status of Danish banks prior to the August 2008 Roskilde Bank 
bailout was ―good‖ because of the relatively few problems in procuring 
 
 
 140. See Andersen‘s 2003 Speech, supra note 50. 
 141. Bodil Nyboe Andersen, Governor, Danmarks Nationalbanken, Speech at the Annual Meeting 
of the Association of Danish Mortgage Banks (29 April 2004) (transcript available in DANMARKS 
NATIONALBANK—MONETARY REVIEW 2ND QUARTER 2004, at 135 (2004), available at http://www. 
nationalbanken.dk/C1256BE9004F6416/side/Monetary_Review_2004_2_Quarter/$file/MON2_04_we
b.pdf.). 
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liquidity. The majority of portfolios included mortgage-credit bonds that 
could be pledged as collateral at Nationalbanken, thus allowing an avenue 
for the bank to procure liquidity. The financial statement stated that the re-
mortgaging of mortgage-credit loans from fixed-rate to ARMs had no 
impact on the liquidity of a bank because Nationalbanken offered the same 
collateral, if needed. 
Roskilde Bank had severe liquidity issues which led to its failure. This 
may be best explained through the use of ―loan bills.‖ Borrowing by banks 
via ―loan bills‖ uses a program specifically instituted for the period 
between May 23, 2008 and September 30, 2010.
142
 Banks can issue ―loan 
bills,‖ which are then purchased by other banks. Purchasers of loan bills 
can use the bills as collateral at Nationalbanken to obtain cash for 
temporary liquidity needs.
143
 Thus, if one bank ―lends‖ money to another 
bank by purchasing a loan bill, the lending bank need not fear that the 
outlay of capital will then be unrecapturable in the short term to meet 
liquidity needs because Nationalbanken would supply it, if necessary. The 
program was intended to promote the exchange of liquidity between 
banks.
144
 If this program was in place, did Roskilde not issue loan bills? Or 
did other banking institutions opt to not purchase Roskilde‘s loan bills 
despite the option to obtain cash from Nationalbanken on those loan bills? 
The record hints at the latter. While there is little detailed information 
about the failure of the bank, it was known that other banks were reluctant 
to purchase Roskilde‘s holdings in July 2008 when Roskilde first put itself 
up for sale. At that time, no other banks were interested in purchasing 
Roskilde. In this climate, even with the backing by Nationalbanken 
allowing loan bills to be converted to cash for short term liquidity needs, 
there were no banks who would wish to hold on to a loan bill for the long 
term, as evidenced by the lack of buyers for the bank. 
While it has been acknowledged by Jens Thomsen that increasing 
global market exertions on the Danish mortgage bond market make it 
improbable that mortgage regulations will be used again as a 
macroeconomic policy tool, it must also be recognized that Danish 
mortgage regulations continue to affect market outcomes. The 
 
 
 142. Terms and Conditions for Temporary Secured Lending Facility at Danmarks Nationalbank, 
in DANMARKS NATIONALBANK—REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2009, http://www.nationalbanken.dk/ 
C1256BE900406EF3/sysOakFil/%20200903_Bestemmelser_laan_mod_sikkerhed_laaneobligationer_
ENG/$File/200903_Terms_cond_Temporary_Secured_Lending_Facility.pdf. 
 143. Report of the Board of Governors 2008, in DANMARKS NATIONALBANK—REPORT AND 
ACCOUNTS 2008 (2008), available at http://www.nationalbanken.dk/DNUK/Publications.nsf/ 
89fd431fb535b111c12570d6004e29de/5977a14a66300b5fc125757c004a7ccc/$FILE/kap02.htm. 
 144. Id. 
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liberalization of the laws post-1993 and the ensuing economic growth is 
illustrative of such positive effects. While existing mortgage regulations 
could not prevent Roskilde Bank‘s collapse, they did prevent widespread 
bank failure.  
It is remarkable that the history of the Danish mortgage system 
demonstrates a constancy of changed circumstances and reaction. Because 
of a devastating fire, a new system of mortgage lending arose. After the 
implementation of a new constitution, mortgage regulations were codified. 
In response to the increased debt and monetary instability throughout the 
world during the 1960s and 1970s, acts were passed restricting the 
maturity periods on loans and the loan-to-value ratio of a particular 
mortgage loan. Then, there was a period of relaxation of some of the rules 
to promote the creation of new products, followed by a period of 
additional rules to ensure that the products continue to adhere to basic 
principles of the Danish mortgage market.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Danish mortgage bond system provides consumer flexibility and 
investor confidence. Consumers receive loans at interest rates determined 
solely on the market and type of loan, as opposed to based on a derived 
credit risk analysis. They may pre-pay their loans by calling or delivering 
the underlying bonds to the mortgage credit institute. The delivery option, 
which is not available in the United States, allows borrowers to capitalize 
on market fluctuations even when interest rates rise. In the United States, 
one of the few markets that also allows prepayment, only secondary 
markets can capitalize on these fluctuations.
145
 The trade-off for this 
market transparency and accessibility is the strict LTV ratio maximum 
imposed on the loans. 
In the Danish mortgage system, investors are shielded from most risk 
factors. While they may be subject to interest rate risk and prepayment 
risk, mortgage credit institutes provide transparent records regarding 
prepayment trends of each issued bond series.
146
 Credit risk is largely 
accounted for by guarantees from the mortgage credit institute or lending 
banks. Stability of the entire system is grounded in the balance principle. 
 
 
 145. See Svenstrup & Willemann, supra note 6, at 107 (illustrating the buyback or delivery option 
differences between Denmark and the United States). 
 146. Investors are given historical prepayment rates as well as weekly preliminary estimates. 
DANISH MORTGAGE BONDS, supra note 7, at 34. 
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The Danish mortgage system model, though espoused as one of 
constancy—the balance principle was essentially maintained for over 200 
years—is an example of a mortgage system that constantly evolved with 
the economic status of the times.
147
 This evolution is necessary to maintain 
a healthy economy. While it is no longer explicitly asserted that the 
Danish mortgage system is used as a ―macroeconomic policy tool,‖ the 
system in reality is, and moreover it must be, malleable to serve the needs 
of the economy at a given time. The ―bailout‖ of Roskilde by 
Nationalbanken is not necessarily a sign of ensuing turmoil in the system, 
but rather is an example that the worst-case scenario can occur. However, 
the system has survived this worst-case scenario, demonstrating that the 
system, as it is, can handle economic crises. These crises serve as yet 
another fulcrum for reexamining the system to understand what the next 
step ought to be in its evolution. 
Jocelyn H. W. C. Chong  
 
 
 147. For example, ―[t]hanks to the balance principle, . . . new types of [ARMs] do not result in 
additional large funding or liquidity risk for the mortgage banks.‖ THE DANISH MORTGAGE 
MARKET—A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 9. 
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